Washington’s smaller NATO commitment is forcing Europe to prove it can carry more of the alliance’s defense burden. The quick fix is impressive, but it also exposes where Europe still depends on American power.
Europe is trying to answer a question it has avoided for decades: how much of NATO can it hold up if the United States puts fewer forces on call?
The short answer appears to be more than many expected. The longer answer is less comfortable, because the gaps that remain are exactly the kind that money, politics and procurement schedules cannot fix overnight.
A fast scramble inside NATO
European NATO allies have moved quickly to cover most of the shortfalls created by reduced U.S. commitments to the alliance’s defense plans, according to comments attributed to NATO’s top commander and reporting by Defense News and Reuters.
U.S. Air Force Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s top military commander, said European allies had “largely filled” the gaps left by U.S. reductions to the NATO Force Model within weeks. He also said NATO was looking for alternatives in the few areas where allies do not have a direct replacement.
That matters because the NATO Force Model is not symbolic. It is the pool of forces and capabilities allies are expected to make available in a crisis or war. If the United States assigns fewer aircraft, ships or specialized assets to that pool, someone else has to cover the mission or NATO has to rethink how to accomplish it.
The issue has gained urgency ahead of a NATO summit in Ankara on July 7-8, where allies are expected to discuss how Europe is absorbing the shift.
The U.S. pullback is targeted
This is not a clean break from NATO, and it is not the same as the United States leaving the alliance. The reported change is narrower but still significant: Washington is reducing the military capabilities it has committed to NATO for use during a crisis.
Reuters reported in May that the Pentagon planned to shrink the pool of U.S. military assets available to NATO in such scenarios. Defense News later reported, citing Reuters and NATO-related sources, that the reductions cover several categories, from fighter jets and refueling aircraft to drones and ships.
The reported numbers show why European officials are treating the matter seriously. U.S. F-15 and F-15E fighter jets available to NATO would fall by about a third to 99. MQ-4 and MQ-9 Reaper drones would be cut by half to 12. Refueling aircraft would drop to 63 from 79.
Other areas are also affected. Maritime patrol aircraft would fall to 15 from 26, destroyers to nine from 17, and NATO would lose a U.S. cruise-missile submarine from the committed pool, according to figures cited in the reporting.
The bomber gap stands out
The most stubborn hole is strategic bombers. A NATO source cited by Reuters said the United States would make one strategic bomber available instead of two, leaving European allies with a capability that is especially hard to replace.
That is not just a question of aircraft count. Strategic bombers represent range, payload, deterrence and escalation control. They are part of the visible signal NATO can send to an adversary without immediately putting large land forces in motion.
Europe has advanced air forces, strong pilots and increasingly capable missiles. But it does not have the same long-range bomber fleet the United States brings to the alliance. Finding an “alternate capability with matching effect,” as Grynkewich described it, may mean combining different systems rather than swapping one aircraft for another.
That is the core problem now facing NATO planners. Some gaps can be filled by reallocating forces. Others require a different concept of operations.
Europe can move, but slowly
The speed of the European response is notable. For years, U.S. officials across administrations have pushed European allies to spend more on defense and rely less on American forces. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine sharpened that debate and forced many capitals to move faster.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said in mid-June that other allies were increasing their contributions and would fill “a lot” of the gaps, though he did not provide detailed figures at the time.
The challenge is that defense spending does not instantly create deployable capability. A government can announce a bigger budget in one year, sign contracts in another, and still wait years for aircraft, ships, missiles, trained crews and maintenance networks.
That lag is especially acute for high-end assets such as aerial refueling, surveillance drones, air defense, submarines and long-range strike. These are not easy purchases from a shelf. They require factories, skilled personnel, secure supply chains and years of training.
Washington wants less dependence
Grynkewich described the U.S. move as part of an effort to end what he called an “unhealthy co-dependence” on American forces. The phrase points to a larger strategic reality: the United States is trying to preserve flexibility for possible crises beyond Europe.
U.S. military planners increasingly think in terms of multiple theaters. A major conflict in Europe, a crisis in the Indo-Pacific and instability in the Middle East could compete for the same aircraft, ships, munitions and command attention.
From Washington’s perspective, a Europe that can shoulder more of its own defense is not only a burden-sharing goal. It is a way to keep U.S. options open elsewhere.
From Europe’s perspective, the shift lands differently. Even if the United States remains committed to NATO, fewer preassigned U.S. assets mean European governments must plan for a less automatic American cushion.
The politics are unavoidable
The military discussion is unfolding under political pressure. Some European governments remain concerned that U.S. support for NATO could become less predictable, especially after repeated threats by President Donald Trump to withdraw or reduce America’s role.
That uncertainty changes calculations in European capitals. Defense plans are no longer just about meeting NATO targets or satisfying Washington. They are about ensuring that Europe can respond if American attention, equipment or political will is divided.
Still, the latest reporting cuts both ways. It shows that Europe has been dependent on U.S. capabilities in critical areas. It also shows that European allies can move quickly when forced to do so.
The coming test is whether that scramble becomes a durable shift. Filling a spreadsheet gap before a summit is one thing. Building the forces, industries and political habits needed for long-term European defense is much harder.
The takeaway for NATO
NATO’s immediate message is likely to be reassurance: most gaps have been filled, the alliance is adapting, and the United States is still inside the tent. That message is important, especially at a time when adversaries watch alliance divisions closely.
But the quieter message may matter more. Europe is entering a phase in which it can no longer assume that U.S. military depth will always cover the most difficult missions.
The bomber gap is a symbol of that new reality. It is small in number, but large in meaning.
Europe may be able to patch most of the holes left by a smaller U.S. NATO commitment. The question now is whether it can build a defense posture that does not need emergency patching every time Washington changes the terms.
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